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Abstract 
This paper offers an analysis of Walmart’s contested expansion in the retail business. It draws on, 
and develops, some aspects of the capital as power framework so as to provide the first quantitative 
explication of the company’s power trajectory to date. After rapid growth in the first four decades of 
its existence, the power of Walmart appears to be flat-lining relative to dominant capital as a whole. 
The major problems for Walmart lie in the fact that its green-field growth is running into barriers, 
while its cost cutting measures seem to be approaching a floor. The paper contends that these 
problems are in part born out of resistance that Walmart is experiencing at multiple social scales. 
This resistance helps to explain why Walmart is nearing what appears to be an ‘asymptote’ – a 
distributional limit that the company might not be able to pass. Walmart’s power trajectory may give 
us clues about the future limits on the power of dominant capital as a whole. 
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Introduction  
By some measures Walmart is the world’s largest corporation. The retail giant has garnered more 
annual revenues than any other business for seven of the last ten years. And with 2.2 million 
employees, it has about as many people in uniform as the People’s Liberation Army of China. 
Walmart’s gargantuan size has made it the focus of much attention from journalists and scholars 
alike. In particular, the social effects of its model of Everyday Low Prices – in which very cheap 
products are sold in very high volumes - have been hotly debated. Economic geographers, labor 
historians, business analysts, neoclassical economists and sociologists have all weighed in on the 
discussions (c.f. Basker, 2007; Bianco, 2006; Gereffi & Christian, 2009; Jacques, Thomas, Foster, 
McCann & Tunno, 2003; Lichtenstein, 2006). While some have pointed to the savings that Walmart 
offers to cash-strapped consumers, others have sought to highlight the deleterious effects of 
Walmart’s cost cutting strategies on its own employees, on local communities and on the workers 
that toil in sweatshop conditions for Walmart’s suppliers. 
Much of the research done on Walmart is very instructive for those who seek to make sense of the 
company. However, what all of the analyses appear to lack is a systematic quantitative means of 
actually gauging the changes in Walmart’s power. And without a clear conception of Walmart’s 
power trajectory, it is difficult to make sense of the wider significance of the insights that existing 
analyses offer. This paper seeks to make up for this deficiency by drawing on, and developing, 
aspects of the capital as power (CasP) framework propounded by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon 
Bichler. The CasP framework offers a method of analyzing relations of control and resistance as they 
redound across every social scale (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009). As Nitzan and Bichler argue, these 
disparate and heterogeneous power dynamics can be empirically investigated because their effects 
are encoded into the universal metric of capital.   
The paper argues that Walmart’s meteoric rise to the upper echelons of big business in the 1970s and 
1980s was driven by a potent accumulation regimen of obsessive cost cutting and relentless green-
field development. However, by the 1990s the company’s accumulation engine appeared to be 
nearing the zenith of its effectiveness. Indeed, as Walmart’s share of overall corporate profits got 
larger, resistance to further increases in its profit share intensified. This intensified resistance came 
from a whole gamut of groups, ranging from retail rivals, to labor unions to community activists. 
And partly as a result of the intensified resistance, Walmart’s green-field expansion efforts appear to 
be running into barriers and its cost-cutting measures appear to be approaching a floor.          
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The argument is divided into four sections. The first section elaborates on the CasP approach and 
demonstrates how it can help the researcher chart the development of Walmart’s power in the last 
four decades. The second section seeks to make sense of Walmart’s golden age of rapid growth by 
offering some new quantitative measures of the company’s pecuniary performance. In particular, I 
examine the development of Walmart’s distinctive accumulation strategy and the wider social 
conditions within which the strategy became so successful. The third section examines the 
slowdown in Walmart’s accumulation of power in the 1990s and 2000s. It suggests that this 
slowdown can in part be understood in relation to the mounting resistance that Walmart has 
encountered both directly and indirectly. The concluding section proposes widening the vista of 
inquiry, by considering the internationalization of Walmart’s retail operations. It suggests that 
despite this internationalization, Walmart’s accumulation of power appears to be approaching a 
quantitative limit that the company may not be able to pass. 
 
Capital as Power 
Building in part on Thorstein Veblen’s theory of business sabotage, Nitzan and Bichler argue that all 
profits stem from the institution of private ownership as it confers upon owners the power to exclude 
others from using their assets. Without private ownership there could be no restriction on the use of 
goods; and without restriction on the use of goods, goods could not be priced into commodities that 
yield pecuniary earnings. But exclusion within capitalism goes way beyond matters of pricing power. 
It entails the wholesale delimitation of the manifold possibilities of human creativity and social 
development down avenues propitious for profit growth. The foundational exclusionism of private 
ownership is evidenced in the etymological roots of the word private: ‘privatus’ and ‘privare’ – Latin 
for ‘restrict’ and ‘deprive’ (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009).  
The CasP framework suggests that capital is the central institution of exclusion in contemporary 
society. Unlike modalities of exclusion that were widespread in the past, such as feudal relations of 
custom and fealty; and unlike other forms of exclusion that persist today, such as sexism and racism, 
capital endows exclusion with a quantitative syntax. This syntax is capitalization: the formula 
through which risk-adjusted expected future earnings are discounted to their present value. Nitzan’s 
and Bichler’s theoretical innovation lies in recasting the discounting formula from the perspective of 
what they call dominant capital: the major firms and government entities at the core of 
accumulation. Capitalization is all encompassing. Any power process that bears on the expected 
future earnings of any given asset is factored into the capitalization formula. And since dominant 
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capital actively seeks to re-shape power processes in a manner that augments future income and 
reduces risk, market value is itself the master signifier of business power. This insight has far-
reaching implications. Instead of being a mere tool that enables owners to re-actively measure the 
value of their ownership claims, capitalization is the inter-subjective means through which dominant 
capital communicates its capacity to actively restructure society (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009).  
However, the CasP approach is not just influenced by Veblen`s analysis of business, but also by the 
philosophical worldview of Friedrich Hegel. As Hegel argues, reality is constituted by negation. Just 
as exclusion is predicated on the threat of its transgression, power presupposes resistance. Following 
on from this, the CasP framework suggests that corporate agency does not exist in a vacuum, but 
rather in a force-field of social struggle. As such, in the final analysis, capitalized power represents 
“confidence in obedience” (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009, 17).  It is the quantitative analogue that tells the 
researcher how certain dominant capital is of the underlying population acquiescing to its pecuniary 
advancement.  
This insight has profound implications on how we view the space within which business operates. 
Instead of following neo-classical economists in taking power to be a distortion external to the 
market, the CasP framework suggests that power is actually commodified by the market via 
capitalization. Accordingly, the researcher should consider every social process where the dynamics 
of restructuring and resistance bear on the pecuniary earnings of business. These dynamics 
encompass, but are by no means limited to, ‘the sphere of production’ privileged in Marxist political 
economy. Nitzan and Bichler draw on the concept of the hologram to explain this new way of 
seeing capitalist order: power emanates from each and every part of the whole; and the overall 
power shifts within the whole reflect back on each and every part (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009). 
In the CasP approach, then, capitalism is considered to be neither a mode of production nor a mode 
of consumption, but instead a mode of power. And as power is inherently relational and inter-
subjective, Nitzan and Bichler argue that firms’ pecuniary operations should be understood in 
relative rather than absolute terms. This relativity has both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. 
On the quantitative side, it is indicated by the fact that corporations do not seek to reach a 
conceptually indeterminate ‘profit maximum’. Instead they benchmark their own performance in 
relation to an average. And on the qualitative side, the relativity is manifest in the fact that different 
groups of corporations constantly seek to transform myriad institutions of social order, against 
opposition, so as to augment their power over and above other business groups (Nitzan & Bichler, 
2009).  
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Through charting the long-running historical correlation between earnings per share and stock price 
in the S&P 500 dataset, Nitzan and Bichler show that current earnings are used by investors as the 
central guide for discounting expected future profits to their present value (2009, p. 186). Thus, profit 
growth is the main long term driver of capitalization growth. But what propels profit growth? 
Observing that a firm’s earnings can be calculated as the product of the number of its employees and 
its average earnings per employee, Nitzan and Bichler argue that companies can augment their profit 
in two main ways: i) by increasing their employee numbers; or ii) by increasing their profit per 
employee.1 Moreover, there are a variety of ways in which firms can attain more employees and 
more profit per employee (2009, pp. 328-31). Nitzan’s and Bichler’s schema is graphically 
summarized in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Axes of Pecuniary Expansion 
 
The breadth axis of pecuniary growth refers to the firm’s overall employee numbers. This measure 
can be used as a proxy of the extensiveness of the firm’s power. Early on in the development of firms, 
breadth expansion usually takes the form of green-field development. However, as firms become 
larger in size they are increasingly able to raise capital to buy up other firms through merger and 
acquisition (M&A). The depth axis refers to the firm’s profits per employee. This measure can be 
used as an indicator of the intensiveness at which the firm projects its power onto its own employees, 
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and onto individuals and organizations outside of its immediate operational scope. Increased depth 
can be achieved through cutting costs, via operational efficiency gains and lower input expenses; or 
through price rises. As with mergers and acquisitions, price rises are characteristic of larger firms’ 
operations. This is because firms usually have to be of a significant size in order to engage in 
successful collusion. But as Nitzan and Bichler argue, the same does not apply to cost cutting. 
Rather than just being the preserve of dominant capital, cost cutting is a ubiquitous business 
practice. New and improved production techniques easily spread from one firm to another; 
moreover reductions in input costs are usually not restricted for the benefit of one firm. As such, 
Nitzan and Bichler contend that in the long-run, cost cutting enables corporations to merely “meet 
the average, not beat it.” (2009, p. 363). 
According to the CasP framework, the differential accumulation of dominant capital as a whole is 
achieved primarily through countercyclical waves of price rises and mergers and acquisitions. 
However, as Nitzan and Bichler argue, the patterns of dominant capital may not be representative of 
how individual firms have augmented their own pecuniary earnings. This insight is certainly true in 
relation to Walmart. In terms of depth, downward ‘price leadership’ rather than upward price 
collusion has defined its business model of lean retailing. It is thus primarily through cost cutting 
that Walmart has sought to increase its profits per employee. In terms of breadth, for much of its 
history, green-field investment has been Walmart’s preponderant means of increasing its 
organizational scale. And rather than operating counter-cyclically as with the breadth and depth 
waves of dominant capital as a whole, Walmart’s cost cutting and green-field investment have 
proceeded in a coeval and symbiotic manner. This symbiosis can be seen in the ‘virtuous cycle’ of 
profit growth in which high sales volume finances low-margin pricing and low-margin pricing drives 
high sales volume. 
With some key aspects of CasP’s theory of accumulation sketched, we can now begin to trace the 
power trajectory of Walmart. Figure 2 offers the starting point of the empirical analysis. In what 
may be the first quantitative explication of Walmart’s power trajectory to date, the chart depicts the 
firm’s differential capitalization and differential profit as set against the average corporation within 
dominant capital, both plotted against a logarithmic scale. The proxy used for dominant capital is 
the Compustat 500 – the 500 largest firms by market capitalization listed in the US.  
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Figure 2: The Differential Capitalization and Differential Net Profit of Walmart 
 
Note: Differential capitalization is the ratio of Walmart’s market value to the market value of the average 
corporation in the Compustat 500. Differential net profit is the ratio of Walmart’s net income to the net 
income of the average corporation in the Compustat 500. The Compustat 500 is the top 500 firms by  
market value listed in the United States. 
 
Source: Walmart and Compustat 500 net income and market capitalization data from Compustat through 
WRDS. Series codes: NIQ; PRCQ and CSHOQ. 
 
Three major observations can be made from the chart. Firstly, the growth in differential 
capitalization and differential profit of Walmart are very tightly correlated. This strong correlation 
underlines the importance of understanding current earnings as driving the long-term increases in 
the capitalization of the company. Secondly, the figure clearly shows that the period spanning from 
the late 1970s to the early 1990s represents a true golden age for Walmart.  Indeed, in 1975, the 
market capitalization of Walmart is just one-tenth of the average firm in dominant capital, but in less 
than two decades the relative capitalization increases almost one hundredfold, so that by 1993 
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Walmart’s capitalization is over nine times larger than the average dominant capitalist firm. Thirdly, 
from the early 1990s onwards Walmart’s capitalization appears to oscillate below a differential 
ceiling, reaching a peak in 2003 and then trending downward slightly for all but three of the 
following ten years. 
These insights into Walmart’s differential pecuniary trajectory recall Nitzan’s and Bichler’s recent 
analysis of the possible limits on the pecuniary growth of dominant capital as a whole. In this 
analysis, Nitizan and Bichler suggest that dominant capital may be reaching an ‘asymptote’ – a 
distributional limit that it cannot surpass. This focus on pecuniary limits is grounded in their 
understanding of capital accumulation as a power process of relative gain. From Nitzan’s and 
Bichler’s view, after a certain point, the greater the share of profits that dominant capital wants to 
secure, the more resistance it will encounter. The more resistance dominant capital encounters, the 
more force dominant capital will have to project on society. And the more force dominant capital 
projects on the rest of society, the greater the potential for severe dislocation and concomitant 
backlash (Nitzan & Bichler, 2012).    
To the extent that a corporation as vast as Walmart can be referred to as a microcosm, it is perhaps a 
microcosm of this process. As stated in the introduction, the retail giant has recorded the highest 
revenues out of any firm in the world for seven of the last ten years. Walmart is thus positioned at 
the apex of dominant capital. And, according to the data presented in Figure 2, if there is an 
asymptote for the company’s pecuniary growth, it seems to be around a differential capitalization 
ratio of 10, or 2% of the market value of the Compustat 500 as a whole. In what remains, I explore 
the thesis that Walmart is nearing some differential pecuniary limit. More specifically, I show how 
cost cutting and green-field growth propelled Walmart’s rapid expansion in the 1970s and 1980s. I 
then show how the symbiosis between cost cutting and green-field investment became less and less 
effective as Walmart got larger in size and as resistance mounted. If Walmart is to expand its power 
further it will have to increasingly obey the logic of dominant capital: by engaging in price rises or 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The strategy of enforcing price increases as a means of spurring 
growth is alien to the company’s model of lean retaining; so instead it has pursued the strategy of 
buying up and expanding retail operations abroad. However, at least for the foreseeable future, it is 
unlikely that these efforts at foreign retail colonization will yield the increases in differential 
pecuniary returns that Walmart experienced during its initial ascent into dominant capital. 
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Walmart’s Golden Age of Accumulation: 1960s to the mid-1990s 
i) The evolution of Walmart’s model of lean retailing 
Walmart’s model of lean retailing took shape in its early development during the 1960s in 
Bentonville, in North West Arkansas. At this time agricultural production was getting increasingly 
mechanized and this caused the displacement of tens of thousands of workers from the region’s 
farmland. Walmart was thus able to draw upon surfeits of cheap, mostly female, labor. And the 
company wanted to keep things this way. Unlike other retail giants, such as Sears, that 
accommodated unionization in the post-war era, Walmart took a zero-tolerance approach to 
organized labor. It viewed unions as an intrusion upon managerial authority and an impediment to 
the firm’s hallmark cost cutting strategy (Lichtenstein, 2006).  
Walmart’s aversion to unions was manifest in the geography of the company’s early expansion. For 
the first two decades of its existence, Walmart built almost all of its stores in small towns in the 
Southeast and Midwest where organized labor has historically been weak. It largely avoided the 
‘archipelago’ of union strongholds stretching from the District of Columbia to the metropolitan areas 
of New York, Boston, Minneapolis, Seattle and San Diego (Lichtenstein, 2009). The company’s 
focus on rural America also stemmed from two other considerations. Firstly, land-use regulations 
were relatively loose in the Midwestern and Southwestern states. Secondly, Walmart’s rivals tended 
to rule out non-urban communities as being too insignificant to bother with. Walmart’s top 
managers were not beholden to the received wisdom and saw the vast swathe of near virgin retail 
territory in rural America as the potential outlet for irresistible growth (Graves, 2006; Holmes, 2011).  
However, Walmart’s rural green-field growth strategy was not without its challenges. Most notably, 
by opening its stores in remote parts of the US, Walmart had difficulty securing dependable and low-
cost deliveries from its suppliers (Graves, 2006). Given this problem, Walmart chose to develop its 
own distribution system and soon became renowned for being a true pioneer in ‘logistics’ – a field of 
knowledge which had hitherto been associated with the art of war-making. Walmart did away with 
whole regiments of supply chain middlemen and unleashed a barrage of penalties on suppliers that 
did not deliver to the last letter on their contracts. Moreover, in the 1970s Walmart began replacing 
traditional warehouses with distribution centers (DCs). Through facilitating cross-docking - a 
process through which merchandise was transferred directly from incoming rail cars and trucks 
directly to outgoing trucks - these DCs reduced the time that Walmart held inventory from a matter 
of months to a matter of hours (Lichtenstein, 2009). The savings from this process were 
considerable. By the end of the 1980s, Walmart’s distribution costs were only 1.35% of sales, while 
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the corresponding figure for rival companies Kmart and Sears was 3.5% and 5% respectively (Vance 
& Scott, 1994, p. 92).  
Moreover, these DCs constituted the basis for the company’s hugely effective ‘hub and spoke’ 
strategy of extending its retail imperium. This strategy entailed setting up a DC in one location and 
then constructing 75 to 100 stores within one day’s drive away from the DC. Once the catchment 
area was filled with stores, Walmart would open up a new DC in an adjacent region. There were 
two major advantages of this method of expansion. Firstly, it increased name-recognition for 
Walmart within the areas in which it operated and thus lessened advertising costs. And secondly, it 
discouraged the market entry of retail rivals that belatedly recognized the commercial potential of 
small-town retail markets (Roberts & Berg, 2012). By the end of the 1980s the company became the 
third largest retailer in the US, even though it operated in only half of the American states (Vance & 
Scott, 1994). Thus, Walmart’s method of internalizing distribution functions into its own pecuniary 
ambit proved to be a very effective way of forestalling the mimetic effects of cost cutting on the one 
hand, and of accelerating its green-field growth on the other.   
Walmart was also one of the first discount firms to adopt Universal Product Code, or UPC, 
scanning. This barcode scanning technology obviated the need for retail clerks to engage in the 
cumbersome practice of keying in inventory data by hand and it thus enabled Walmart to expedite 
consumer traffic at its checkouts. Moreover, by offering such an efficient way of capturing 
purchasing patterns, the technology also helped curtail the informational advantage that 
manufacturers had in regard to consumer behavior. Walmart sought to increase its data-gathering 
capacities further by launching the world’s largest private, integrated satellite network in the mid-
1980s. Walmart’s very own geostationary satellite, positioned some 34km above the world’s surface, 
transmitted all of the barcode data scanned at store checkouts to company headquarters in 
Bentonville. These data were then processed almost instantaneously, thus allowing Walmart to 
speed up the reordering of store merchandise. The satellite also beamed live pep talks given by 
company founder, Sam Walton, to hundreds of thousands of his employees at a time, via the 
company’s television network (Lichtenstein, 2009). And in 1990, Walmart sought to build upon its 
existing barcode and satellite technologies, through the introduction of Retail Link. This addition to 
Walmart’s repertoire of logistical technologies enabled the company to develop a ‘just in time’ 
supply system as it facilitated the communication of real-time sales and in-stock data to its suppliers. 
As Sam Walton once reflected, “people think we got big by putting big stores in small towns. Really 
we got big by replacing inventory with information” (cited in Berg & Roberts, 2012). The truth was 
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that Walmart got big because of both factors. Walmart’s rapid spatial expansion and its logistical 
supremacy were mutually reinforcing (Bonacich & Hardie, 2006). 
Due to this mutually reinforcing dynamic between Walmart’s rapid spatial expansion and its 
logistical supremacy, Walmart was almost becoming a state within a state. It even had its own 
nomenclature. The company’s precariously employed workers were christened ‘associates’; its 
human resources department was termed ‘the People Division’; its founding founder was known by 
the sentimental moniker ‘Mr. Sam’ and his multimillionaire directors were named, in true Orwellian 
fashion, ‘Servant Leaders’. In one bizarre instance of megalomania, Walton broadcast a video of 
himself to his employees enjoining them to raise their hands and to repeat the following pledge:  
“From this day forward, I solemnly promise and declare that for every customer that comes within 
ten feet of me, I will smile, look them in the eye, and greet them, so help me Sam” (cited in Vance & 
Scott, 1994, p. 107).  
Walton even invented a rallying cry for the firm – ‘the Wal-Mart Cheer’ – that its retail clerks and 
shelf stackers are still expected to sing with gusto at the beginning of every morning shift 
(Lichtenstein, 2009). As such, the late ‘Mr. Sam’ clearly had no qualms about imbuing the firm with 
a cultish philosophy. Yet despite the eerie and totalitarian air of Walmart’s expanding techno-
cultural complex, there is no denying that the company’s logistical vanguardism helped drive its 
growth in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
ii) Transformations in the Social Hologram of Power 
However, it would be wrong to attribute Walmart’s early pecuniary success solely to the 
corporation’s own agency. As the CasP framework suggests, we need to relate our findings back to 
the social hologram: the general force-field of power within which corporations operate. The 
development of Walmart’s model of lean retailing both contributed to changes in the hologram of 
power and was reinforced by them. 
For one thing, the decline of organized labor in the US from the 1970s onwards was highly 
propitious for Walmart’s expansion. Indeed, although Walmart avoided a head-on clash with unions 
partly because of its rural location strategy, the company also benefited from the fact that the morale 
of union organizers within the retail sector was sapped by a series of defeats suffered by the 
American labor movement as a whole. Chief among these defeats was the failed passage of the 
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Labor Law Reform Act in 1978 and Reagan’s hugely symbolic quashing of the Professional Air 
Traffic Controllers Organization strike in 1981 (Lichtenstein, 2009). Against this backdrop of union 
retrenchment, Walmart was enjoying relative pliancy from its workers.  
Additionally, there was a significant shift in the balance of power away from the manufacturing 
sector toward the retail sector in the US. For much of the twentieth century, manufacturers used a 
legal device known as resale price maintenance (RPM) to set a minimum price at which their goods 
were sold. When Walmart was founded, RPM was already in decline and once the Consumer 
Goods Pricing Act was passed in 1975, RPM was completely outlawed. With pricing power shifting 
away from manufacturers, Walmart was able to pursue deep discounting much more rigorously than 
before. But the dissolution of RPM did not just contribute to a power shift between the 
manufacturing sector and the retail sector; it also catalyzed a power shift within the retail business 
itself. Indeed, the Consumer Goods Pricing Act gave Walmart and other large retailers an advantage 
over smaller, service-oriented retail stores that specialized in offering quality point-of-sale 
information on the goods that they sold. With minimum resale values officially withdrawn, price 
became paramount and large discount chains, like Walmart, began to flourish at the expense of 
local, family-owned retail proprietorships (Boyd, 1997).   
The declining role that the manufacturing sector has played in the generation of income in the US 
coincided with the increasing significance of service industries. This shift has been accompanied by a 
profound transformation in American society: the feminization of labor. On the one hand, this 
transformation is reflected in the massive influx of women into paid work: with employment rates of 
adult females shooting up from 48% in 1973 to over 67% in 1997 (Freeman, 2000, p. 5). On the 
other hand, the transformation is constitutive of the degradation of wage labor along lines associated 
with the subordinate gender roles of women. Indeed, the burgeoning service sector has opened up a 
new segment of the labor market characterized by more casualized, more ‘flexible’ and less secure 
work. Women in general, and racialized women in particular, became disproportionately 
represented in these new jobs. Walmart capitalized on this process, and at the same time reinforced 
it, by filling its lowest labor ranks with predominantly female workers, while keeping its managerial 
staff overwhelmingly male. In fact, from the company’s foundation, around 70% of its low-ranking 
employees have been female. Yet even to this day women receive far less pay for the same work that 
their male counterparts carry out, and they only receive around one-third of all promotions to 
managerial positions (Seligman, 2006, p. 237). In true hologramic fashion, oppressive social 
relationships outside of Walmart stores have been reproduced and reaffirmed within them. 
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Moreover, the decline of manufacturing in the US occurred alongside the emergence of global 
manufacturing centers abroad. Of particular importance to Walmart’s expansion was the emergence 
of the ‘East Asian tigers’: South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
the governments of all these countries embarked on a mixture of export-based growth, state-led 
proletarianization and brutal repression of organized labor (Koo 1990; Sen & Koo, 1993). Walmart, 
like other major retailers in the US, took note, and by 1976 it started buying merchandise directly 
from East Asia. Similar to Walmart’s retail operations in the US, patriarchy and pecuniary gain 
dovetail in the disciplinary control of workers in this part of its supply chain. Indeed, as in the US, 
historic legacies of female oppression and domestication in many parts of East Asia has encouraged 
the perception amongst business that women are less likely to agitate in the workplace and demand 
higher wages (Elson & Pearson, 1981; Standing, 1989). Partly as a result, an estimated 90% of 
sweatshop workers that make garments supplied to retailers such as Walmart are women. ‘The 
Orient’, as Sam Walton called it, and its abundance of female labor, became integral to Walmart’s 
cost cutting regimen (Walton & Huey, 1993).      
The company’s initial success in marrying its in-house logistical innovations with supplier discipline 
and wage repression is registered in various differential cost cutting measures as shown in Figure 3. 
The main chart depicts two cost cutting indicators: selling and general administration (SGA) 
expenses per employee and costs of goods sold (COGS) per employee. The first measure calibrates 
the efficiency of Walmart’s internal operations and thus can be seen as a rough proxy of the 
company’s control over its workers. The second measure gages the extent to which Walmart is able 
to project power up its supply chain so as to minimize its external costs. The data are weighted 
relative to the corresponding SGA and COGS expenses per employee of the average firm within the 
Compustat 500. The lower the cost cutting measure, the more intensively Walmart is projecting its 
power onto its own employees and onto its suppliers, relative to dominant capital as a whole. Thus, 
in measuring Walmart’s cost cutting performance in this manner we can build a richer 
understanding of the differential profit and differential capitalization data presented in the previous 
section. 
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Figure 3: The Differential Cost Cutting of Walmart 
 
Note: In the main chart, Walmart’s COGS and SGA expenses per employee are weighted relative to the 
corresponding SGA and COGS expenses per employee  of the average firm within the Compustat 500 to  
yield differential measures. The right-hand axis is, like the left-hand axis, scaled logarithmically. The  
differential expenses measure plotted in the insert is presented as a ratio of Walmart’s combined COGS  
and SGA expenses per employee to the Retail-Core’s combined COGS and SGA expenses per employee.  
The Retail-Core proxy is made up of the top 20 firms by market value listed under SIC codes 53 (General 
Merchandise Stores) and 54 (Food Stores) less Walmart. For details of Compustat 500 see note to Figure 1.  
 
Source: Walmart, Retail-Core and Compustat 500 cost of goods sold, selling and general administration  
  expenses and employee data from Compustat through WRDS. Series codes: COGS, XSGA and EMP. 
 
 
The figure clearly shows Walmart dramatically reduced its differential COGS per employee in the 
1970s. The drop in Walmart’s differential SGA expenses per employee was even longer in duration 
and deeper in intensity, falling in the 1980s when Walmart’s differential COGS had reached a 
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plateau. Another observation one can make from Figure 3 relates to the insert positioned at the top 
right hand corner of the main chart. The insert combines Walmart’s per employee COGS and SGA 
expenses and divides this number by the equivalent expenses per employee of the average firm in the 
Retail-Core: the top twenty largest supermarket and general merchandise firms listed in the US, less 
Walmart. As we can see, Walmart’s expenses differential was falling until the early 1980s and 
remained lower than the average Retail-Core firm until the mid-1990s. Thus, the trends testify to the 
early success of Walmart’s logistical innovations and its disciplinary control over its workforce and 
suppliers. The company’s sales motif of everyday low prices was undergirded by a ruthless regimen 
of everyday low costs (Roberts & Berg, 2012).           
 
The mid-1990s onward: Walmart’s Differential Accumulation Model Runs into Limits 
i) Differential cost cutting approaches a floor 
However, Walmart’s differential cost cutting regimen became less effective through time. Turning 
back to the main chart of Figure 3, the diminished effectiveness of Walmart’s cost cutting strategies 
is indicated by the bottoming out of Walmart’s differential SGA per employee ratio and the flat-
lining of Walmart’s differential COGs per employee ratio in the 1990s. It is also evidenced by the 
sudden increase in Walmart’s expenses relative to the Retail-Core in the 1990s as presented in the 
insert of the figure.  
What explains these trends? As before, one has to look at multiple social scales of restructuring and 
resistance to make sense of Walmart’s cost cutting trajectory. Three factors appear to be of particular 
concern: Walmart’s declining relative logistical advance; the resistance showed by workers 
employed directly by Walmart; and the international transformation in Walmart’s supply base. 
While the first factor may tell us a lot about Walmart’s increasing overall expenses relative to its 
retail rivals, the second factor perhaps illuminates the course taken by Walmart’s differential SGA 
expenses per employee; and the last factor enriches our understanding of the trajectory of the 
company’s differential COGS per employee.  
In regard to Walmart’s declining relative logistical advance, the company is perhaps encountering 
the limits of the possible in terms of its technological innovation. Indeed, Walmart has for a long 
time held the second largest data warehousing system in the world after the Pentagon and by the 
early 2000s this system had more storage capacity than all of the fixed pages on the internet at that 
time (Roberts & Berg, 2012). This technology has empowered Walmart to gain crucial insights into 
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the intricate shifts in the topography of consumer desire and to get its supply chains to respond 
accordingly. To take one example, when in 2004 Walmart found out that Hurricane Ivan was 
heading for the Florida panhandle, Walmart’s complex data-mining algorithms predicted that 
customers, upon hearing news of the impending storm, would be clamoring for Kellogg’s Strawberry 
Pop Tarts. Walmart put its distribution systems on alert and stepped up the delivery of the product 
to its stores in Florida; and true to Walmart’s prediction, sales of the strawberry flavored pastries 
sky-rocketed (Patel, 2007). Yet here lies the problem: having attained this level of logistical 
sophistication, it is hard to imagine how the company can develop even more advanced means of 
predicting, and responding to, short-term consumption trends. Diminishing returns from successive 
logistical breakthroughs appear likely.   
Moreover, other major retailers have managed to replicate some of Walmart’s innovations in supply 
chain management. This pattern of emulation can be seen in the fact that many major retailers have 
developed their own versions of Retail Link. Moreover, since the mid-2000s, Walmart has begun to 
abandon its traditional strategy of developing its logistical capabilities ‘in house’ and it has moved 
increasingly towards using third party data-gathering systems such as Terradata and Oracle Business 
Intelligence. Given this change in policy, it is likely that Walmart is now following technological 
trends rather than setting them. A senior insider of the company confirmed this view of Walmart’s 
technological capacity: “[w]e obviously used to be the leader, but everyone else has caught up” 
(cited in Roberts & Berg, 2012). This process of catch-up is clearly shown in the insert of Figure 3. 
For all but three of the last fifteen years, Walmart’s differential expenses per employee have been 
higher than the average in the Retail-Core. Thus, at least in the case of Walmart, Nitzan and Bichler 
appear entirely correct in their claim that in the long-run, cost cutting merely enables corporations to 
keep up with the average, rather than supersede it. 
In regard to labor relations, Walmart’s differential cost cutting regimen has been complicated by an 
ever more restive workforce. This restiveness is manifest in the huge desertion rates within the 
company’s lower ranks. Indeed, by 1999 the annual labor turnover reached an astonishing 70% as 
employees were buckling under the pressure of harsh work conditions and poverty-line wages. The 
constant need to find replacements was very costly for Walmart because of the significant expenses 
incurred in training new employees. Indeed by the early 2000s it was estimated that Walmart was 
spending $1.4 billion annually to replace the 600,000 to 700,000 workers that leave the company 
each year (Hopkins 2007). Moreover, although Walmart has hitherto this point effectively nipped 
unionization efforts in the bud, lawsuits against the company have offered a fruitful avenue of 
contestation for disgruntled employees. Indeed, by 2004 Walmart was involved in a total of 8000 
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ongoing legal cases (Olive, 2004). The cases were launched in regard to a multiplicity of complaints 
concerning gender and race discrimination, violation of state and federal regulations on overtime, 
lunch breaks and health and safety (Lichtenstein, 2009). The most famous of these was the ‘Duke 
versus Walmart’ case – the largest class action attempt in history, involving 1.6 million female 
plaintiffs who were allegedly discriminated against when working for Walmart. The Bentonville 
giant successfully appealed to the US Supreme Court to revoke the class action status of these legal 
efforts and, in so doing, the company saved itself from the possibility of paying billions of dollars in 
damages. However, Walmart has not been able to avoid all of the legal repercussions of its 
draconian labor practices. To illustrate, in 2008 alone Walmart agreed to pay as much as $640 
million to settle 63 suits across the US over charges that it did not provide its employees with meal 
breaks and proper rest (Banjo, 2012; Reuters, 2012; Seligman, 2006).  
Additionally, there has been a recent upsurge in struggles waged against Walmart outside of the law 
courts. Indeed, in October 2012, over 70 Walmart retail clerks engaged in walkouts in Los Angeles. 
Shortly after, the walkouts spread to 28 Walmart stores in 12 different states.  The strike represented 
the most sustained and extensive labor offensive against Walmart in the company’s history. The 
actions were taken because Walmart allegedly harassed and cut the hours of workers who became 
affiliated to OUR Walmart (Organization United for Respect at Walmart) - a nonunion campaign 
group that seeks better pay, more affordable health care and improved working conditions for 
Walmart employees. The growing resistance, manifest most clearly on the picket line and in the law 
courts, may be contributing to the slight uptrend in Walmart’s differential SGA expenses per 
employee since the turn of the millennium.2   
The data for Walmart’s differential cost of goods sold per employee have a more complex trajectory. 
After an upward lurch in its relative cost of goods sold in the early 1980s, Walmart’s external 
expenses flat-lined for the rest of the 1980s and for much of the 1990s. Then in 2002 Walmart’s 
differential COGS per employee started falling. And in 2007, it almost reached the historic low that 
Walmart attained in the early 1980s, only to rise again somewhat thereafter. As indicated above, in 
order to better comprehend these quantitative changes in Walmart’s relative expenses it may be 
worthwhile considering the contested restructuring of Walmart’s supply chain.   
In the mid-1980s, Walmart’s supply base in ‘the Orient’ shifted away from the East Asian tiger 
countries toward China. This shift was caused by a number of factors: rising wages and a more 
politically assertive working class in South Korea and Hong Kong; the reflation of most East Asian 
currencies as negotiated in the 1985 Plaza Accords; and the market-based transformation of the 
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Chinese political economy onto an export-orientated platform under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping. Since that point, many of Walmart’s suppliers have moved their operations to the coastal 
regions of China. Walmart’s interests were in a number of respects becoming concordant with the 
interests of the Chinese ruling elite as they both united around a common concern over the 
maintenance of Chinese labor discipline, social stability and a devalued renminbi so as to make 
goods from China as cheap as possible. As such, by the early 2000s it appeared that the self-styled 
‘All-American’ retail giant and the Chinese Communist Party had become very strange bedfellows. 
Given the extensiveness of Walmart’s ties with the Chinese export-led growth regime, it is possible 
that the sharp fall in Walmart’s relative external costs between 2002 and 2007 may in part be due to 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. The trade liberalization that ensued made Chinese firms 
much more exposed to international competition which in turn compelled them to cut costs further 
(Andreas, 2008). Walmart sought to cozy up to the CCP further during this period of liberalization. 
Indeed, in the first six years of the 2000s, the then CEO of Walmart, Lee Scott went on five visits to 
China to meet high-ranking government officials, including the then president of the country, Jiang 
Zemin (Wang and Zhang, 2006) And by 2004, Walmart accounted for 15% of the US’s imports 
from the country (Basker & Pham, 2007, 1). Walmart used its extensive negotiating capacity to exact 
favorable terms from its suppliers. Indeed, with more than 200 million customers visiting Walmart 
stores each week, the company has a huge amount of power in determining which manufacturers 
gain access to vast swathes of the retail market in the US and abroad. The company’s gate-keeping 
authority has made Chinese suppliers amenable to the deep price reductions that the retail giant 
demands. In this sense, the capacity to exclude is integral to Walmart’s pecuniary success. It explains 
how Walmart managed to get a head-start on its retail rivals, through internalizing distribution 
functions and developing in-house logistical technologies, and how it managed to gain price leverage 
over its suppliers, through the threat of barring them from its massive consumer base.   
However, many Chinese manufacturers now appear to be squeezed by Walmart to the very limit. In 
fact, during the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, thousands of Chinese manufacturing firms, 
many of which were Walmart suppliers, fell into bankruptcy. And some of the surviving companies 
have adopted a strategy of ‘de-Walmartizing’ their operations so as to reduce their dependence on 
the Bentonville giant’s orders (Hong, 2011). This strategic shift may go some way in explaining why 
since 2007 Walmart’s differential cost of goods sold per employee have risen somewhat. The slight 
uptrend may also partly be the result of the exhaustion of the one-shot effect of the trade 
liberalization inaugurated by China’s accession to the WTO and the gradual reflation of the Chinese 
reminbi against the US dollar since 2010. Indeed, although this gradual reflation may be welcomed 
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by elements of the US government that have accused the CCP of ‘currency manipulation’, it has 
probably had a negative impact on Walmart’s relative external expenses, as it has made Chinese 
exports more costly.  
But perhaps more fundamentally, the slight increase in Walmart’s relative external expenses may be 
the result of the increased difficulty that the Chinese government has had in maintaining the 
obedience of Chinese workers in recent years. Indeed, on a general level, the recent capitalist 
transformation of China has caused a huge amount of social dislocation, and it has contributed to 
rising disaffection amongst the Chinese population. This rising disaffection is registered in the 
thirteen-fold increase in labor disputes recorded in the country between 1995 and 2006 (Harris & 
Luo, 2008). These labor disputes have often spilled over into what the Chinese police apparatus call 
‘mass incidents’. According to Chinese government statistics, these public disturbances – which can 
range from riots, demonstrations, strikes and mob sieges of government offices – have also increased 
dramatically.  In 1994, there were 10,000 mass incidents involving 730,000 participants; but just ten 
years later, in 2004, there were 74,000 such disturbances involving 3.67 million people (Keidel, 
2006, 3).  
The rising social discontent amongst Chinese citizen-workers appears to have caused some discord 
and discomfort between the bedfellows of Beijing and Bentonville. Indeed, in response to the 
increasingly febrile conditions in China, the CCP has made some efforts to mollify workers by 
passing a raft of measures, inimical to Walmart’s differential cost-cutting regimen. The Labor 
Contract Law of 2008 epitomized the CCP’s efforts at restoring ‘social harmony’ in the country. 
This law has strengthened the rights and improved the wage standards of employees and it has at the 
same time increased the production expenses and legal liabilities of employers. Moreover, in an 
effort to avoid future unrest, municipal and provincial governments throughout China are increasing 
minimum wages dramatically. To take one example, in February 2013, it was announced that 
minimum wages are set to increase by 19% in Guangdong. The importance of this hike should not 
be underestimated. As the country’s major export-manufacturing hub, wage increases in the 
province will likely further undermine the deflationary impact China has had on the price of global 
consumer products in general, and the price of products sold in Walmart stores in particular.   
As a result of these changes, many of Walmart’s suppliers have sought to relocate some of their 
operations in countries where the risk of currency appreciation is less pronounced and where labor 
costs are lower. This shift in emphasis was hinted at in Walmart’s announcement in 2010 that it 
would double its purchase of textiles made in Bangladesh and that 20% of its garment shipments 
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would be sourced from the country (Chan, 2011). Bangladesh has a minimum wage of $37 per 
month – the lowest in the world; and it also has incredibly weak manufacturing regulations. 
Unsurprisingly, the cost cutting measures Walmart demands from its suppliers, coupled with the 
loose government regulations, can make working conditions in many of the textile factories very 
hazardous indeed. In fact, in late 2012, a major fire in a cramped garment factory in the suburbs of 
Dhaka killed 112 workers. Five of the 14 production lines in the factory were devoted to making 
clothing sold exclusively in Walmart stores (Greenhouse & Yardly, 2012). Tens of thousands of 
Bangladeshi garment workers took to the streets of Dhaka in protest while the news of the fire was 
broadcast around the world.  
Soon after the factory inferno it was revealed that in 2011 Walmart, with the help of other retailers 
such as Gap, blocked measures proposed by Bangladeshi government officials and labor leaders in a 
key conference regarding fire safety. The Walmart representative in the meeting reportedly demurred 
that the proposed fire safety improvements would entail “very extensive and costly modification” 
and that it was “not financially feasible… to make such investments” (cited in Greenhouse & 
Yardly, 2012). The ultimate price for Walmart’s cost squeamishness was paid by those garment 
workers who died of asphyxiation and first-degree burns. It is unlikely that Walmart will be able to 
enforce further cost reductions in this part of its supply chain without precipitating further ruination 
and uproar. Indeed, Homo Sacer - the ‘bare human life’ excluded from the provisions and protections 
usually afforded to rights-bearing citizens – was embarrassingly revealed by the conflagration; and 
the social limits of Walmart’s minimization of expenses were underscored. In light of the public 
relations disaster, Walmart hurriedly tightened up its supplier fire safety standards. The site of the 
excoriated factory thus represented the true ground zero of Walmart’s global cost cutting drive.  
 
ii) Differential employee growth runs into barriers 
Such are the human consequences of Walmart’s stuttering cost cutting regimen – and the impact 
these human consequences has on further attempts at cost cutting. But what about the other major 
route to its differential growth: greenfield investment? For how long can Walmart keep pace on this 
axis of expansion?  
By the late 1980s much of rural America was integrated by Walmart’s retail operations. And by the 
early 1990s Walmart had come to dominate the discount sector along with its two major rivals – 
Kmart and Sears. Thus, there was little room for Walmart’s continued expansion within its existing 
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pecuniary ambit, both in sectoral and geographical terms. The company was, to borrow a phrase 
from Nitzan and Bichler, “running out of breadth” (2009, 390). In response, Walmart began to 
extend its business interests from rural to metropolitan areas; and from non-food retailing to food 
retailing. However, by extending its dominion in this manner, Walmart was impinging on the 
territorial domains of its rivals. Moreover, by entering the union strongholds in the North East and 
the West Coast, it was also setting itself on a collision course with organized labor. As such, the 
specter of labor resistance did not just haunt Walmart’s cost cutting strategies, but also its green-field 
growth ambitions. (Lichtenstein, 2009; Roberts & Berg, 2012) 
Walmart’s move into groceries and city-spaces catalyzed a breathtaking wave of consolidation in the 
US retailing sector. In the years between 1992 and 2003, thirteen thousand traditional supermarkets 
closed down and at least twenty-five regional grocery chains were driven into bankruptcy 
(Lichtenstein, 2009, p. 135). And as a defensive response to Walmart’s seemingly inexorable 
expansion, the largest supermarkets in the US engaged in a wave of mega-mergers in the late 1990s. 
In 1994 it took 20 of the largest US food retailers to account for 40% of sector-wide sales; but by 
1999 it took just five supermarket chains to attain the same percentage (Milling & Baking News, 
1999, p. 12). By fortifying their hold over their territorial domains, some of the major retailers in the 
US had put up some resistance to the Walmart’s ascent. However, their defensive response by no 
means stopped the Bentonville giant from reaching the commanding heights of the American retail 
sector. In fact, by the mid-2000s, Walmart claimed a 30% market share of all US staple goods and a 
21% market share of food retailing, thus becoming the US’s largest grocer (Jantzen, Pescatrice & 
Braunstein, 2009, p. 297). 
At face-value then, Walmart’s expansion has been a triumph. Astonishingly 96% of the US 
population now lives within 20 miles of a Walmart store and 60% lives within 5 miles (Zook & 
Graham, 2009, p. 20). However, the company has in certain respects become a victim of its own 
success because in some areas of the US new Walmart stores have begun to take business away from 
its existing stores. Indeed, the company estimated in its 2004 Annual Report that existing stores lost 
1% in revenues from the process of ‘self-cannibalization’ (Walmart, 2004). This cannibalization 
cannot be understood without reference to the fact that in the midst of credit crunch and stagnating 
average wage-levels, Walmart’s customers are increasingly constrained by the limits of their 
disposable income. But at the same time, the problem appears intractable as Walmart is a bastion of 
poverty-wages in the service sector as a whole.  
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This tension has played out in Walmart’s ambiguous position in relation to the wrangling over the 
minimum wage in the US. In the mid-2000s Walmart publically backed congressional initiatives to 
increase the minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.25. This support was based on enlightened pecuniary 
interest. As the then CEO of Walmart argued, Lee Scott, “[o]ur customers simply don’t have the 
money to buy basic necessities between paychecks” (cited by Whoriskey, 2013). However, during 
Barack Obama’s presidency Walmart has appeared reluctant to back the White House’s plan to 
increase the minimum wage further to $9, due to the effects that such a wage increase would have on 
its labor costs. And herein lies the dilemma. In conditions of recession, the predominantly low-
income consumer base of Walmart cannot greatly increase its expenditure at Walmart stores, but at 
the same time Walmart is not able to lead the way in improving wages for service sector workers 
without compromising its model of lean retailing.  
However, this hindrance to Walmart’s green-field growth is constituted by consumers’ efforts to live 
within their budget - an inherently latent and passive form of resistance. Yet just as there has been 
active social resistance that has directly scuppered Walmart’s cost cutting strategies as detailed 
above, there has also been active social resistance that has directly targeted Walmart’s green-field 
expansion. Indeed, Bernstein Research, the Wall Street-based investor advisory firm, produced a 
report in 2005 warning shareholders that Walmart’s growth “is under siege in several regions of the 
country from growing opposition by local communities.” The report concluded that the “heightened 
resistance” could slow down the company’s square footage growth rates, which in turn could 
negatively impact Walmart’s stock price and earnings per share (cited by Norman, 2007). 
Community resistance has been most pronounced in the ‘site fights’ headed by local activists and 
labor unions who have sought to lobby local and municipal governments to change zoning and land-
use laws so as to thwart Walmart’s planned store openings. Sometimes these struggles result in 
referenda on Walmart’s entry into communities. Thus in fleeting moments, the demos has arisen to 
punctuate the blanket application of Walmart’s power. And rather than merely being born out of 
‘not-in-my-backyard’ parochialism, these democratic interjections appear to be part of a disparate 
but nonetheless nationwide movement of resistance against the company. As shown in the insert of 
Figure 4, the site fight phenomenon climaxed in 2008, when 70 of Walmart’s planned store openings 
were blocked or postponed. Given the fact that the average Walmart store makes over $50 million in 
annual sales3, each community victory represents a considerable blow to the company.  
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Figure 4: Walmart’s Encumbered Expansion 
 
Note: Differential lobbying effort is calculated by dividing Walmart’s annual lobbying expenditure by the 
estimated lobbying expenditure of the average firm in  the Compustat 500. The estimated lobbying  
expenditure of the average firm in the Compustat 500 is based on the not unreasonable assumption that 
the 500 largest firms account for 85% of total lobbying expenditure in the US. This proportion is then  
multiplied by total lobbying  expenditure, which encompasses the amount spent by corporations, labor  
unions and other organizations to lobby  Congress and other federal agencies. Walmart’s differential  
breadth and sales are  calculated by dividing the employees and sales figures for Walmart by the respective 
employees and sales figures for the average firm in the Compustat 500. Successful site fights are defined  
as those grassroots struggles that  successfully block or postpone the opening up of one or more Walmart  
stores in any one area in the US, through litigation battles and/or the canvassing of support in local  
government.     
 
Source: Lobbying expenditure data from Center for Responsive Politics, 
<http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000367&year=2012> accessed 9 September 
 2012). Walmart and Compustat 500 employee and sales data from Compustat through WRDS. Series  
code: REVT and EMP. Site fight data collected from Al Norman database  
<http.//www.sprawl-busters.com/victoryz.html), accessed 9 September 2012. 
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Partly in response to the intensified resistance, Walmart revised its domestic expansion target in 
2007 from 270 new supercenter openings per year to 170 supercenter openings per year for the three 
following years. (Norman, 2007)  But, despite their being fewer new targets for community activists, 
site fights still rage on. At the time of writing, Walmart was going through a protracted battle over 
plans to open a new store in Los Angeles’ historic Chinatown. In late June 2012, thousands of 
Angelinos - ranging from union organizers to Chinese owners of small ‘mom-and-pop’ shops - 
joined together in the largest anti-Walmart march to date, to express their opposition to the slated 
store opening. In short, active resistance to Walmart’s green-field growth in some areas of the US 
has exacerbated the problems of passive resistance in other areas of the country. 
The site fights and legal battles against Walmart brought the company’s harsh labor conditions, low-
pay and baleful impacts on many small business and communities under spotlight. As such, 
Walmart’s public image appeared increasingly tarnished during the 2000s and this in turn began to 
undermine the company’s sales. Indeed, the management consultants, McKinsey & Company, 
estimated that up to 8% of Walmart’s customers had stopped shopping in Walmart stores because of 
the negative press the retail colossus received (Birger, 2007). This contention is corroborated by the 
quantitative evidence presented in the main chart of Figure 4. The chart shows how Walmart’s 
differential sales – the ratio of Walmart’s revenues to the revenues of the average firm in the 
Compustat 500 – began to grow at a slower pace in the 1990s and then plateaued in the 2000s. 
Moreover, the chart shows that Walmart’s differential breadth, measured as the ratio between the 
number of Walmart employees and the employment of an average Compustat 500 firm, has also 
flattened off dramatically over the last twenty years. Taken together these data suggest that 
Walmart’s expansion has become increasingly encumbered by passive and active resistance.  
As the last CEO of Walmart suggested in 2004, the company is suffering from “exposure” (Humes, 
2011). In order to mitigate its exposure and have more sway over US policymaking, the company 
resolved to insinuate its agenda deeply into US federal governmental structures. A government-
relations unit was established in Washington DC in 1999 and as Figure 4 shows, Walmart began to 
dramatically increase its differential lobbying effort – a measure that compares the company’s 
lobbying expenditure to the estimated lobbying expenditure of the average firm within the 
Compustat 500. The latest coup for the company has come in the form of President Obama’s 
nomination of Sylvia Matthews Burrell – the head of the Walmart Foundation – as director of the 
Office of the Management and Budget (OMB). As head of the Walmart Foundation, Burrell played 
a key role in dispensing Walmart’s ‘charitable’ funds to organizations such as the NAACP (National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People)  in order to win their support for controversial 
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store opening plans in New York and other parts of the US that the company has not yet colonized. 
Burrell would have significant authority to block federal regulations as director of OMB, and could 
thus cultivate a policy environment more propitious for Walmart’s hitherto frustrated growth 
ambitions (Cummings 2004; Eidelson and Fang 2013; Slater, 2003). It remains to be seen whether 
Walmart’s strategy to fuse its pecuniary interests with the authority of government will shore up the 
company’s confidence in the obedience of the American population at large.   
 
Concluding Remarks  
Walmart’s pecuniary success has been based on a reinvestment strategy of logistical innovation, 
rapid green-field growth and rigid control over workers throughout its supply chain. In the first two 
decades of its existence, Walmart could grow largely ‘under the radar’ of retail rivals and organized 
labor. It expanded at a dramatic pace in the relatively un-stored, un-regulated, un-unionized and 
hence uncontested retail landscape of the South East and Midwest. Also, Walmart managed to 
make deep cuts into its operating and inventory costs in its golden age of rapid growth.  It was at the 
forefront in the advancement of new logistical technologies and the internalization of distributions 
functions and thus quickly surpassed its rivals in the field of supply chain management. Moreover, 
although it was not the first major retailer to source goods from East Asia, by the 1990s it had the 
largest network of suppliers in the region. Walmart’s suppliers filled their sweatshops with masses of 
underpaid female workers who had migrated from rural areas, just as Walmart had filled its own 
stores with underpaid female retail clerks that had been displaced by agricultural transformations 
within the US. The success of this explicitly gendered nexus of corporate power is undeniable. No 
other organization in history has capitalized the energies of feminized labor more effectively and on 
such a colossal scale. 
However, Walmart’s supply chain supremacy has been eroded. This erosion has partly been caused 
by the spread of logistical innovations, first appropriated by Walmart, across the retail sector. It has 
also been caused by opposition to Walmart’s model of lean retailing at all levels of its supply chain: 
from its workers involved in the OUR Walmart campaign; from its suppliers whose wafer thin 
margins can hardly be rendered any thinner; and from the suppliers’ employees who at times are 
engaging in a life and death struggle for humane work conditions. In sum, the differential advantage 
Walmart has attained through cost cutting has been circumvented over time by the process of 
business replication and the absolute gains Walmart has made from cost cutting has run into limits 
imposed by social resistance.  
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Additionally, as Walmart expanded into the metropolitan areas of the North West and the Far West 
in the 1990s, it was harder for the company to apply its distinct model of retailing, because in these 
parts of the US unions are more active, municipal zoning rules are more heavily contested and the 
company’s major retail rivals are stronger. As such, soon after Walmart moved into these areas it 
became subject to increased resistance. By virtue of its sheer size and prominence in the US retail 
sector, Walmart became a company that could not be ignored.  Its green-field growth strategy in the 
US became encumbered by contestation and its name became sullied by its association with low 
pay, poor labor conditions and discriminatory practices against its female and racialized employees.   
Up to a point then, Walmart could defy the logic of differential accumulation by combining green-
field growth and cost cutting. But now Walmart appears to be reaching an asymptote. In order to 
stave off differential decline, the firm will have to obey the imperatives of dominant capital – by 
increasingly engaging in either price rises or mergers and acquisitions. Price rises are anathema to 
Walmart’s model of lean retailing and so it appears that the Bentonville giant is chiefly seeking to 
expand through acquisitions abroad. An assessment of these retail operations is beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, it is worth nothing that Walmart’s foreign retail operations now account for 
28% of Walmart’s total sales and 23% of its profits (Wal-Mart, 2012). These data are admittedly 
imperfect indicators of the extent of Walmart’s internationalization given the vicissitudes of 
international exchange rates and transfer pricing, nonetheless the gap between the share of total sales 
and the share of total operating income held by Walmart’s international division suggests that the 
company’s US business continues to be more profitable than its non-US retail operations.  
Moreover, as the data in Figures 2 and 4 suggest, the internationalization efforts have not reversed 
Walmart’s slowing growth in its relative employee numbers, nor has it contributed to a sustained 
increase in the company’s differential capitalization. In fact, in 2012 Walmart announced that it 
would cut store openings for its international division by an astounding 30% (Jopson, 2012). The 
massive downsizing of expansion plans was motivated by the desire to attain satisfactory levels of 
profitability and assuage outstanding bribery claims made against the company. Bribery allegations 
first broke out after revelations that Walmart greased up its expansion in Mexico through systematic 
skullduggery, but it now encompasses alleged breaches in US anti-corruption laws in its nascent 
operations in India. With opportunities for frictionless growth characteristic of the first few decades 
of its existence long gone, Walmart appears to be pushing the limits of legality in its bid to expand 
further (Barstow, 2012).  
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The prospects of Walmart experiencing another golden age of rapid growth look very dim indeed. 
Walmart’s differential capitalization appears to have been oscillating toward a pecuniary ceiling for 
the last two decades. This finding suggests that investors’ remain agnostic about Walmart’s capacity 
to greatly increase its earnings relative to dominant capital as a whole in the future. This agnosticism 
appears to be partly born out of an awareness of the opposition, both latent and active, that Walmart 
is encountering at multiple social scales. In 2012 alone, Walmart witnessed the largest street protest 
and its first ever labor strike. As four of the top ten richest people in the US are members of the 
Walton family and as millions of ‘associates’ are struggling to get by on poverty wages, the company 
might get drawn into the wider politicization of inequality that has occurred since the 2011-12 
Occupy Movement. Thus, as Walmart has become a central part of the social hologram of power, 
conflictual dynamics within the company are increasingly mirrored in the conflictual dynamics of 
society as a whole.  
To conclude, given the bleak pecuniary situation in the US, Walmart is increasingly dependent on 
the success of its embattled international division. If no transformative upsurge in foreign investment 
takes place, Walmart may experience relative stagnation or even differential decline. What is more, 
the significance of these findings may extend way beyond the future of one company. Given the fact 
that inequality is reaching historic highs in many advanced capitalist countries and given the 
seemingly ever more frequent eruptions of unrest in many of the global major manufacturing 
centers, the long arc of Walmart’s accumulation of power may offer interesting clues about the 
future trajectory of all dominant corporations. In short, the exemplar of rapid business growth in the 
late twentieth century may become the harbinger of the limits to corporate power in the twenty-first.  
 
 
Acknowledgments  
I would like to thank Jonathan Nitzan, DT Cochrane and Sandy Brian Hager for the invaluable support 
that they have offered at every stage of the research and writing of this paper. I am also grateful to 
Ontario’s Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities for awarding me an Ontario Graduate 
Scholarship in support of my research.      
 
 
  
28 
 
Notes 
1. Profits are usually decomposed into sales and the profit to sales ratio. However, I follow Nitzan and Bichler 
in taking employee numbers to be my measure for breadth. This is firstly because profit can be directly derived 
from sales by simply deducting expenses. An increase in profits will necessarily entail an increase in sales or a 
decrease in expenses or both. But there is not a similarly direct relation between profit and employee numbers. 
An increase in profit may entail an increase or a decrease in employee numbers. This makes employee 
numbers and profits per employee conceptually distinguishable analogues of the extensiveness and the 
intensiveness of business power, respectively. Using employee numbers, rather than sales, as an indicator of 
breadth makes intuitive sense as well. All hierarchical organizations in history have been measured by the 
number of ‘head’, or capita, under command (see Nitzan & Bichler, pp. 328-9). For the same reasons, I use 
expenses to employee ratios, rather than expenses to sales ratios, as measures of businesses’ cost cutting 
success later on in the paper.    
2. In January 2013 Walmart announced that would hire every US army veteran that wants a job in the 
company. Presumably, this new hiring policy was advanced partly to enhance the public image of the 
company. Moreover, the new hiring policy may also be informed by the belief that those who are trained in 
the armed forces tend to have a greater respect for hierarchy and are more likely to disseminate an atmosphere 
of discipline within the workplace. Thus, the influx of army veterans in Walmart’s employment ranks may 
make those associates who question the authority of the company’s management feel more isolated (Dao, 
2013).  
3. Author’s calculations. 
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